One Belt One Road Strategy of China: India’s Response

One Belt One Road Strategy of China:  India’s Response

Singh, Amar (2016), “China’s One Belt, One Road Strategy : Implication for India”, in Girish Kant Pandey & Varnika Sharma (eds), “ India & China Beyond 2020”, ,G.B. Books, New Delhi. 

The revival of the ancient Silk Road into the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Strategy or the new Silk Road project is China’s initiative to keep the economy on growth path and also keep popular support alive. Chinese leaders want to capitalize on the country’s significant success in building its internal infrastructure over the last several decades by extending those achievements abroad. Its “one belt, one road” project is a state-led initiative that will encompass as many as 60 countries on three continents, thereby giving Chinese companies international outlets and extending China’s influence across the globe. India and China have a competitive yet cooperative relationship. India has not signed on to the  OBOR  strategy  as  it  has  concerns  over  some  aspects  of  it  –  especially  the  China  Pakistan Economic Corridor and the   Maritime Silk Road  and has proposed its own “Spice Route” or “Mausam Project" with India at the centre of Indian Ocean relations. China and India have growing but yet somewhat unbalanced economic linkages – with a large trade deficit in favour of China. This paper attempts to discuss India’s options and strategy to engage with China’s new Silk Road strategy.[1]

Purpose, Priorities, and Intended Consequences:

President  Xi  Jinping’s  initiatives, especially his 2012 vision of realising the Chinese  Dream  of  ‘great  national rejuvenation’,  and the  2013  vision  of  the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SREB) and the 21st  Century  ‘Maritime  Silk  Road’  (MSR), together  collectively known  as  “One  Belt, One  Road”  (OBOR),  are  likely to significantly shape the future configuration of Eurasia, the Asia-Pacific, and the world.[2] His main idea is to restore China’s pre–nineteenth-century grandeur and influence in order to make it a “prosperous, strong, culturally advanced and harmonious country.” The proposed revival of a great trade route, that two thousand years ago bridged Eastern and Western cultures across the Eurasian continent might well help realize that objective.[3] These two concepts envision the creation of a highly integrated, cooperative, and mutually beneficial set of maritime and land-based economic corridors linking European and Asian markets.[4]

Over 2,100 years ago, China’s Han dynasty launched what would become the original “Silk Road,” dispatching emissaries from the ancient capital of Xian in 138 BC to establish economic and political relations with societies to China’s west.[5] The Silk Road was a network of trade routes, which originated from Chang’an (now Xi an) in the east and ended in the Mediterranean in the west, linking China with the Roman Empire. As China’s silk was the major trade product, German geographer “Ferdinand von Richthofen” coined it the Silk Road in 1877.  It was not just one road but rather a series of major trade routes that helped build trade and cultural ties between China, India, Persia, Arabia, Greece, Rome and Mediterranean countries. It  reached  its height during  the Tang Dynasty, but declined  in  the Yuan dynasty, established by  the Mongol  Empire, as political  powers along  the route became more  fragmented. The Silk Road ceased to be a shipping route for silk around 1453 with the rise of   the Ottoman Empire, whose rulers opposed the West.[6]

OBOR is an emblematic project, critical for defining China’s future global role. The  somewhat  inelegant  wording  of  One Belt,  One  Road  notwithstanding,  it symbolises China’s economic and political resurgence  in  the  world.  It is, simultaneously, a foreign policy initiative and a part of China’s policies to accelerate its own internal transformation.  It  is  a master  plan  for  rebalancing  the  Chinese economy,  marketing  its  infrastructure  and project  exports,  and  connecting  it  more rapidly  to  Asia,  Europe,  and  Africa.[7] The OBOR initiative is considered as an idea of collaborative development built upon a historical background of the ancient Silk Road, both on land and at sea.

On land − The OBOR initiative will focus on jointly:

• building a new Eurasian land bridge;

• developing China-Mongolia-Russia, China- Middle East- Europe, China-Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors; and

•  by taking advantage of international transport routes, relying on core cities along the OBOR and using key economic industrial parks as cooperation platforms.

At sea − The OBOR initiative will focus on jointly building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting major sea ports along the OBOR. It is designed to go from China's coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China's coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.[8]

 It is closely related to:

•  The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; and

•  The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor.

At the heart of One Belt, One Road lies the ambitious vision of the opening-up and cooperation among the countries along the original Silk Road through Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East and Europe, as well as a maritime road that links China’s port facilities with the African coast, pushing up through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean.[9] The OBOR initiative is designed to encourage the countries to:

·         improve the region's infrastructure, and put in place a secure and efficient network of land, sea and air passages, lifting their connectivity to a higher level; and

·         further enhance trade and investment facilitation, establish a network of free trade areas that meet high standards, maintain closer economic ties, and deepen political trust.[10]

Regions to be included:

The OBOR runs through the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and the developed European economic circle at the other, and encompassing countries with huge potential for economic development. The Belt focuses on:

·         Bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic);

·         Linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and

·         Connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean.[11]

Economic Elements:

The drivers of China’s “one belt, one road” initiative are, first of all, economic. As a prominent Chinese academic economist puts it, the project is “a long-term macroscopic program of strategic development for the entire state.” More specifically, a critical mass of political, policy, and business elites in China see the “one belt, one road” idea as critical to promoting more geographically balanced growth across all of China. Through thirty-five years of economic reform, development has been concentrated in the country’s eastern half. The New Silk Road Economic Belt, especially, is designed with a goal of jump-starting economic modernisation in western China. Beyond its impact inside China, the “one belt, one road” vision seeks to cultivate new export markets for Chinese goods and capital. China’s growth model based on its role as the world’s manufacturing powerhouse is now considerably more challenging. The slowest GDP growth in 24 years last year, demonstrates that China faces a “new normal” where growth may be slower and the most important economic drivers will change.[12]

CHINA has been growing extremely rapidly for a long time, but an important shift in its growth pattern occurred at the time of the global financial crisis. During the six years up to 2007 China’s GDP grew at an average rate of 11 percent, with investment equaling 41.5 percent of GDP. The current account surplus was rising in this period, reaching over 10 percent of GDP. In the six years since the global crisis, the external surplus has fallen sharply into the range of two to three percent of GDP, but the shortfall in demand was made up almost completely by an increase in investment, which has reached more than 50 percent of GDP in recent years. China’s growth has been impressive compared to the rest of the world, but lost in the admiration is the fact that the growth rate has slowed down to around seven percent—down more than four percentage points from the pre-crisis period. Thus, in the recent period China has been using a lot more investment in order to grow significantly more slowly than in the past. This pattern of growth manifests three problems. First, technological advance, as measured by Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth, has slowed down. Second, and closely related, the marginal product of capital is dropping (it takes more and more investment to produce less and less growth). The real world indicators of this falling capital productivity are empty apartment buildings, unused airports, and serious excess capacity in important manufacturing sectors. The third manifestation of China’s growth pattern is that consumption is very low, especially household consumption, which is at only one-third of GDP. China’s response to this changing growth dynamic is partly external and partly internal. To tackle this problem, China launched expensive new initiatives, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the BRICS Bank, and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative in order to strengthen infrastructure both on the westward land route from China through Central Asia and on the southerly maritime routes from China through Southeast Asia and on to South Asia, Africa, and Europe to market its excess manufacturing goods.[13]

Chinese policymakers recognise that the potential for further growth in traditional markets of US and Japan is considerably smaller than in earlier phases of reform; they believe that, to compensate, China must nurture new export markets to its west. Chinese analysts say that the territory encompassed by the New Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road contains 4.4 billion people (63% of the world’s population), with an aggregate GDP of $2.1 trillion (29% of the world’s aggregate wealth). But, for this zone to play the economic role envisioned by Chinese leaders, it is necessary to encourage development not only in western China, but in economies across Eurasia — another major goal of both the New Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. It also means that, to be economically sustaining, these initiatives cannot be limited to areas contiguous to China. They must extend further westward, to include already more developed markets in eastern and southern Europe.[14]

OBOR is being promoted as “China’s idea and everyone’s opportunity,” in the words of  Liu  Xiaoming,  China’s  Ambassador  to the  United  Kingdom.  It  is  perhaps disingenuous  to  claim  that while  other great  powers  think  in  terms  of  balance  of power,  the  Chinese  objective  is  purely benign, to assist all participants to “ride on China’s economic express train.”China  says  OBOR  is  all  about  the economy  and  development,  an  almost exclusively  geo-economic  initiative  that has little to do with geopolitics. Observers outside  China,  however,  see  it  also  about security  and  strategy,  entailing  a  higher level  of  Chinese  military  presence  in  the South  China  Sea,  the  Indian  Ocean,  the Persian  Gulf  and  the  Mediterranean. China’s  geo-economic  imperatives  cross the  lines  of  geo-strategy,  which  can undermine the lofty objective of building a ‘community of common destiny.[15]

Strategic Rationales

Alongside these economic motives, Chinese interlocutors acknowledge that there are powerful strategic rationales for the “one belt, one road” approach. Certainly, the approach reflects Chinese leaders’ awareness of their country’s growing political as well as economic power; it also reflects the deepening of Chinese interests in strategically important regions to its west (e.g., the Persian Gulf). In a regional context, OBOR and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — reflect Beijing’s increasingly evident assessment that Asian affairs should be managed more decisively by Asians themselves, not by extra-regional actors like the United States.

Chinese policymakers have framed their “one belt, one road” initiative as a response to the Obama administration’s much hyped “pivot to Asia.” Besides specific redeployments of US military forces associated with American strategic rebalancing, Chinese elites increasingly see the United States engaged in economic, political, and military initiatives aimed at containing China’s rise as a legitimately influential player, in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. In the face of these trends, China is seeking to meet US efforts to contain it to its east by expanding its diplomatic and political engagement to its west — including areas like the Persian Gulf that Washington has long considered vital to America’s global position. To be sure, Beijing continues to rule out the possibility of military confrontation with the United States as in no way a rational prospect. But it also continues to seek a long-term transformation in the character of contemporary international relations — from an international system still shaped in large measure by unipolar American dominance to a more genuinely multipolar international order. To this end, the “one belt, one road” project could — if handled adroitly — prove a non-military catalyst that accelerates the relative decline of U.S. hegemony over the Persian Gulf and engenders a more balanced distribution of geopolitical influence in this strategically vital region.[16] This will make china sole power in the Asian region, which can be a very serious concern for India.

Problems, Challenges and Implications for Other Powers

USA:

Indirectly criticising the US as a traditional power, Chinese officials and academics repeatedly stress that the OBOR is not like the Marshall Plan. Wang Yi states that comparing the OBOR to the Marshall Plan is like comparing “apples and oranges”. The OBOR is based on “open cooperation”  – which implicitly means that the  Marshall  Plan  was  not.  The Marshall Plan placed harsh political conditions on the countries it covered and excluded pro-Soviet European countries, which led to the division of Europe. The OBOR initiative, on the other hand, is presented as an unconditional plan to assist in the development of China’s neighbours, regardless of their current relationship with China. No country is being “forced” to join China’s initiative, even though China’s neighbours will most probably join because of the attractiveness of the initiative. As the engine of global development, China is aiming to share the benefits of its economic growth. Academics such as Wang Yiwei criticise the US’s regional “strategic encirclement” of China, but all the writers insist that the OBOR initiative does not target the US, nor should it be seen as a response to the US rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific.[17]

Rebalance to the East

Post-2008, probably the most advanced US strategy, is the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP].  This  brings together  12  countries  in  the  Pacific,  including  Japan, Canada,  Mexico  and  Australia,  among  others;  China  and  India  are  out. There is an invitation of sorts for India, which is dithering in its response – nothing new here.  As far as China is concerned, Obama, said in an interview to The Wall Street Journal, “If we don’t write the rules, China will write the rules out in that region. We will be shut out…”The details of the negotiations are being kept confidential, if it works out, it will cover some 30% of world trade. As to the Asia-Pacific, and complementing the TPP, is a security approach to the region, the Rebalance, or the Pivot. While the US has had a security arrangement with Europe for decades, NATO, there is nothing matching that in the Asia-Pacific. There are bilateral  security arrangements  with  countries  in  the  region,  but  that  is  proving insufficient  now.  The  Rebalance  is  an  effort  at  exploring  a  multilateral arrangement, which will allow different degrees of commitments; that is to  say,  with  some  countries,  presumably  India  or  Vietnam,  a  formal Treaty  arrangement  is  not  possible,  and  yet,  they  can  and  should  be persuaded  to  play  a  more  active  role  in  maintaining  the  stability  of  the region.[18] There is a situation where both USA and China trying to expand their sphere of influence but there is almost no risk of US-China military competition in the west, because the two countries have a common interest in stability in the region, including in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and because there is huge potential for bilateral cooperation.”.[19] However some Chinese scholars of international relations believe the Asia-Pacific region is already divided between a China-Russia axis and a US-Japan axis. They view both the OBOR and the US’s Trans-Pacific Partnership as moves in a zero-sum game.[20] But some points out that China is still a middle-income country and has no guarantee that rapid growth will continue. So Chinese government should stick to the goal of a “peaceful rise”. It should treat other Asian countries as equals and should even welcome US and Japanese participation in China’s new institutions. Its also point to be noted that regional powers, too, are wary of China’s rise. China must avoid the perception that it is challenging Russia’s position in Central Asia and India’s position in South Asia, while many of the target countries for the Maritime Silk Road project are currently involved in territorial disputes with China, which may make them reluctant to cooperate. In order to overcome this scepticism, China should use its growing strength to persuade its neighbours to “shelve disputes and pursue joint development”.[21]

Future direction for India:

As far as India concern there are conflicting views in on whether China’s OBOR strategy represents a threat or an opportunity. Some view it as a strategy which China will use to encircle India. Some consider it as a great opportunity to attract the much-needed infrastructure finance into India to fill its infrastructure growth and boost growth and employment. And also regard it as a fait accompli in which India must engage  to  derive  as  much  benefits  from  it  as  possible. What is emerging is a competitive yet cooperative approach from both China and India, in the Indian Ocean and in the South China Sea and parts of East Asia. China is a “new type of rising power”. According to China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that the OBOR was not a “tool of geopolitics”. In a nod to Western critics’ fears about China’s real intentions, he said the project should not be viewed through an “out-dated Cold War mentality”. China’s vice foreign minister, Zhang Yesui, echoed this message of reassurance and said that China’s OBOR is “not directed against any specific country or organisation” but is a “useful complement” to existing international and regional institutions. This official position has since been repeated in the Chinese press.[22]

India  has  not  signed  onto  the  OBOR  strategy  and  has  concerns  especially  with  the  MSR, whereas China has expressed opposition to Indian interference in the South China Sea.  India was upset about the Chinese President’s recent commitment to invest $47 billion in rail, road infrastructure and a virtual trade corridor connecting West China to the strategic Gwadar port in Pakistan. This will enable China to carry oil and gas from Iran and Arab countries via Gwadar port which was also built by China.  India’s  objection  is  that  the  trade  corridor  and  rail-road  link  goes  through  Pak  occupied Kashmir. Nevertheless, India has signed onto becoming a founding member of the AIIB and the NDB. At  the  same  time  India  has  begun  its  own  long  overdue  initiatives  in  the  Indian  Ocean  to counter the Chinese and ensure that China does not start to dominate the Indian Ocean –  through its “String  of  Pearls”.  India’s  maritime  initiative  on  the  Indian  Ocean  has  been  variously  presented  as “Project  Mausam”,  “Spice  Route”,  “  Cotton  Route  “Sagar  Mala”  and  the  Blue  Revolution  (from  the Ashoka  Chakra  on  the  Indian  flag)  and  SAGAR—Security  and  Growth  for  All  in  the  Region.  The initiative envisions India as the center of the “Indian Ocean world,” which stretches from Africa in the west to Southeast Asia in  the east. Like China’s  Maritime Silk Road, Project Mausam would boost regional commercial and cultural linkages  –  but where the MSR would have all roads leading back to China,  Project  Mausam  seeks  to  return  India  to  its  role  as  the  center  of  Indian  Ocean  trade.  The project has three-dimensional approach: first, to deepen cultural bonding, second, to ensure maritime security and third, to broaden economic connectivity with nations of the Indo-Pacific Region. China has tried hard to get India to find ways to bring the MSR and India’s  Mausam (Spice Route) projects together.  On the surface, the two projects do have  much in common –  both seek to expand regional integration, especially when it comes to trade and commerce. But on  a deeper level, both  the  MSR  and  Project  Mausam  are  about  expanding  influence  –  culturally,  economically,  and even  strategically.  India  devised  Project  Mausam  to  counter  perceptions  that  China  was  becoming the  major  Indian  Ocean  power.  The  Indian  Ocean  carries  one  half  of  world's  container  shipments, one-third  of  the  bulk  cargo  traffic  and  two-thirds  of  the  oil  shipments,  though  three-fourths  of  this traffic goes to other regions of the world and is just trans -shipped through the Indian Ocean.[23] India will continue to cooperate with China where it can. In the quest to connect a fragmented Asia, there is scope for India and China to pursue both individual  and  joint  actions,  as  Prime Minister  Narendra  Modi  said  in  his address to students at Tsinghua University, Beijing. India’s  positive response, in principle, to China’s proposed connectivity linkage through Myanmar–Bangladesh and Nepal, and its initiative to institute  new  multilateral financial  institutions  such  as  AIIB  (it  is now  considering  also  an  SCO Development Bank) is clear indication in that direction.

Conclusion:

India shall also have to be ready to compete with China where it must, in part by lifting the level of its regional partnerships particularly in its contiguity. It shall also have to be watchful that China does not use OBOR as a guise to build its military capabilities to India’s detriment. Finally, India and China need to enter into a complimentary effort to craft security architecture in Asia for the management of its commons, including the seas. This can be attempted, Prime minister Modi suggested in China, by deepening the bilateral strategic communication,  by  ensuring  that  their relationships  with  other  countries  do  not become a source of concern for each other, and by seeking to work together wherever possible  and  feasible  (such  as  during  the Nepal  earthquake,  or  potentially  in stabilising Afghanistan). Both OBOR and the future Asian security architecture are inconceivable without a Sino-Indic confluence. But there remain pitfalls and potential problems – India’s  concerns  on  Chinese  growing influence  in  South  Asia,  the  South  China  Sea  dispute,  and in the Indian Ocean. Its matter of great observation and analysis for India as China executes its OBOR strategy, which will be closely watched.

 References:

[1] Chhibber, Ajay (2013), “China’s One Belt One Road Strategy: The New Financial Institutions and India’s Options”, Working Paper No. 2015-155, September, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.

[2] Prasad, Jayant (2015), “One Belt and Many Roads: China’s Initiative and India’s Response”, Issue Brief September, The Delhi Policy Group, New Delhi.

[2] Rolland, Nadège (2015), “China’s New Silk Road”, The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Commentary 12 February, Washington.

[3]Ibid

[4]Swaine, Michael D.(2015), “Chinese Views and Commentary on the ‘One Belt, One

Road’ Initiative, China Leadership Monitor, no. 47, [Online: web] Accessed on 25 November 2015,URL:  http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm47ms.pdf

[5]Leverett, Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett And Wu Bingbing (2015), “China Looks West:What Is at Stake in Beijing’s ‘New Silk Road’ Project”, The World Financial Review, January – February.

[6] Cheung, Francis and Alexious Lee (2015), “One Road One Belt: Brilliant Plan”, CLSA, [Online: web] Accessed on 29 November 2015,URL:  https://www.clsa.com/special/onebeltoneroad/

[7] Chhibber, Ajay (2013), “China’s One Belt One Road Strategy: The New Financial Institutions and India’s Options”, Working Paper No. 2015-155, September , National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.

[8] “China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative -New Silk Road Initiative for Inter-continental Growth”, (2015), Briefing-August, Simmons & Simmons, HongKong, [Online: web] Accessed on 25 November 2015,URL:  http://www.elexica.com/en/legal-topics/commercial/18-one-belt-one-road

[9] Cheung, Francis and Alexious Lee (2015), “One Road One Belt: Brilliant Plan”, CLSA, [Online: web] Accessed on 29 November 2015,URL:  https://www.clsa.com/special/onebeltoneroad/

[10] “China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative -New Silk Road Initiative for Inter-continental Growth”, (2015),Briefing-August, Simmons & Simmons, HongKong.

[11] Ibid..

[12] “One Belt and One Road”: Forging A New Vision For Shared Economic Growth”,(2015), [Online: web] Accessed on 11 November 2015,URL:  http://www.pymnts.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/CDF-2015-One-Belt-One-Road-MasterCard-White-Paper.pdf

[13] Dollar, David (2015), “ China’s Rise as a Regional and Global Power”, Horizons, Summer , No.4, Belgrade, [Online: web] Accessed on 25 November 2015,URL:  http://www.cirsd.org/uploads/useruploads/Documents/Horizons---Summer-2015---Issue-No.4.pdf

[14] Leverett, Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett and Wu Bingbing (2015), “China Looks West: What Is at Stake in Beijing’s ‘New Silk Road’ Project”, The World Financial Review, January – February.

[15] Prasad, Jayant (2015), “One Belt and Many Roads: China’s Initiative and India’s Response”, Issue Brief September, The Delhi Policy Group, New Delhi.

[16] Leverett, Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett and Wu Bingbing (2015), “China Looks West: What Is at Stake in Beijing’s ‘New Silk Road’ Project”, The World Financial Review, January – February.

[17] Cohen, David (2015), “China’s ‘second opening’: Grand ambitions but a long road ahead”, in “One Belt, One Road: China's Great Leap Outward” edited by Francois Godement and Agatha kartz, Chinese analysis, June, European Council on Foreign Relations and Asia Centre, Paris. [Online: web] Accessed on 25 November 2015,URL:  http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_analysis_belt_road.pdf

[18] Shukla, Amb. Prabhat P (2015), “ Understanding the Chinese One-Belt-One-Road”, Occasional Paper – August 2015,Vivekananda International Foundation,, New Delhi

[19] Cohen, David (2015), “China’s ‘second opening’: Grand ambitions but a long road ahead”, in “One Belt, One Road: China's Great Leap Outward” edited by Francois Godement and Agatha kartz, Chinese analysis, June, European Council on Foreign Relations and Asia Centre, Paris. [Online: web] Accessed on 25 November 2015,URL:  http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_analysis_belt_road.pdf

[20] Wang, Zhongguo Xinwen (2014), “Silk Road Economic Belt May Be Divided Into Three Phases; Initial Completion Predicted in 2049”, 28 June.

[21] Cohen, David (2015), “China’s ‘second opening’: Grand ambitions but a long road ahead”, in “One Belt, One Road: China's Great Leap Outward” edited by Francois Godement and Agatha kartz, Chinese analysis, June, European Council on Foreign Relations and Asia Centre, Paris. [Online: web] Accessed on 25 November 2015,URL:  http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_analysis_belt_road.pdf

[22] Bondaz, Antoine(2015), “Rebalancing China’s geopolitics”, in “One Belt, One Road: China's Great Leap Outward” edited by Francois Godement and Agatha kartz, Chinese analysis, June, European Council on Foreign Relations and Asia Centre, Paris. [Online: web] Accessed on 25 November 2015,URL:  http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_analysis_belt_road.pdf

[23] Chhibber, Ajay (2013), “China’s One Belt One Road Strategy: The New Financial Institutions and India’s Options”, Working Paper No. 2015-155, September, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.