Indian Ocean and India’s Maritime
Security Challenges in the 21st Century
Dr. Amar Singh
Assistant
Professor
Department of
Defence and Strategic Studies
Dharm Samaj
College, Aligarh, - 202001
Shodh Sarita , January - March 2021,Vol. 8, Issue 29,Page nos. 68-73
Abstract
In the
twenty-first century, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean (IO) dominates Asia
and destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.” This famous prophesy
of Alfred Mahan, shows the importance of Indian Ocean not only for the
world but also for India. India encounter a plethora of traditional
and non- traditional security challenges linked to the maritime domain. Recent clashes
between India and China over Galwan valley has led to greater degree of insecurity
and destabilization in Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In this context
the purpose of this paper is to look into challenges that India face in
IOR and also its strategic response.
Keywords: Maritime
Security, Indian Ocean Region, SLOCs, Blue-Water Navy.
Introduction:
The Indian Ocean is the only ocean named after a country
that is India. It is the third largest Ocean in the world, runs from the
eastern shores of Africa and the Middle East to the western shores of Australia
and the Malay Peninsula, framing the entire southern shoreline of Asia.[1]
Historically it can be easily
said that IO has played a pivotal role in the history
and indeed the destiny of its littoral states. India has a huge coastline of 7500 Km. and more
than 1200 islands, farthest of them is Andaman & Nicobar Island which is about
1600 km from the nearest mainland. India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as per
the UNCLOS (United Nation Convention on Law of the Sea) covers 2.4 million sq. km.,
which is 200 nautical miles from baselines. This, indeed, is a vast ‘maritime
space’ and ‘strategic space’ for India.[2]
The global and regional geo-strategic environment
has been seeing great sift in 21st century from a Euro-Atlantic to
Indo-Pacific. This repositioning of global economic and military power towards
Asia has resulted in significant political, economic and social changes in the
IOR and it has impacted India’s maritime environment in tangible ways. As India
moves forward in the 21st century, its development and prosperity will remain
closely linked to the maritime domain.[3]
Before going deep into it we look at the pivotal role of Indian Ocean it plays for
India.
Geo-strategic importance of the IOR:
·
IOR hosts over 40 nation
and home for more than 2.6 billion people, nearly 35% of the world`s
population.
·
It forms a vital
part of the global shipping routes and network, including vital choke points.
·
IO is the energy
lifelines of the global economy as 16.8 % of known world oil and 40% of natural
gas reserves are in its littoral states. 27.9% of the world’s liquid natural
gas transits through the Gulf.
·
Growing connections
between maritime security and insecurity ashore. [4]
Geo -economic Importance of the Indian Ocean:
·
About 30% of world
trade is handled in the ports and half of the world’s container traffic passes
through Indian Ocean.
·
The Indian Ocean
accounts for 40% of the world’s offshore oil production and 80% of the world’s
oil shipments travel through its water.[5]
·
More than 90% of
India’s international trade by volume and over 70% by value is carried over the
seas.
·
Nearly 90% of the
country’s crude oil requirement is imported by sea, using the ISLs (International
Sea Lines) across the IO. Offshore gas fields also contribute to 80% of India’s
domestic natural gas production.[6]
· The Persian Gulf and its littoral, is home to more than seven million
expatriate Indians.
·
The IO providing
approximately 28% of the total world’s fish catch and India is the second
largest producer of fish in the world, accounting for 5.68% of the world’s fish
production.[7]
India’s Maritime Interests:
Strategically,
India has one of the most coveted locations on the world map from defence point
of view and it could turn India into a naval super power.[8]
Taking this into account India’s maritime interest are as follows:
·
Protect India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
against threats in the maritime environment — i.e., freedom from threats arising ‘in’ or ‘from’ the
sea.
·
Provision of support succor and extrication-options to
the Indian Diaspora and promote safety and security of shipping, fishing,
trade, energy supply, assets and resources in the maritime domain.
· Pursue peace, stability and security in India’s maritime zones, maritime neighborhood and other areas of maritime interest.[9]
· The promotion, protection and safety of India’s overseas and coastal seaborne trade and her ‘Sea Lines of Communication’ (SLOCs) and the ports.[10]
India is essentially a status quo power and harbors no extra-territorial ambitions. However, India has island territories in the Bay of Bengal as well as the Arabian Sea and it has friends in the Indian Ocean Region, whose security is its concern, Therefore, contingencies can be envisioned where it may be compelled to cross the seas to protect its own island territories, or even reach “out of area” to safeguard the interests of its friends. Historically for far too many centuries of its history India has neglected its maritime affairs, after almost a millennia of inward and landward focus, now once it has again turning its gaze outwards and seawards, which is the natural direction of view for a nation seeking to re-establish itself not simply as a continental power, but even more so as a ‘maritime’ power - and, consequently, as one that is of significance upon the global stage.[11]
India’s Maritime Security - Aim and Objectives
India’s maritime
security aims to safeguard national maritime interests at all times. Based on India’s
maritime interest, following objectives can be drawn:
·
To conduct maritime military operations in a manner that
enables early termination of conflict on terms favourable to India.
·
To shape a favourable and positive maritime environment,
for enhancing net security in India’s areas of maritime interest.
·
To protect Indian coastal and offshore assets against
attacks and threats emanating from or at sea.
·
To develop requisite maritime force levels to safe guard
its SLOCs.[12]
Complexity and ambiguity are hallmarks of today’s
security environment, especially in the maritime domain. Today variety of
actors threatening the maritime domain and continues to grow in number and
capability, defeating these threats remains India’s foremost objective.
Strategic Scenario:
Indian Ocean has once again become an area of strategic
competition among extra regional and resident power and they have potential to
become cause of conflict. Since any strategy is set in the context of a given
politico-military situation and within the ambit of an overall set of national
aims, let us next look at the strategic scenario around India and IOR to
identify specific threats and opportunities, as they exist today and
extrapolate them for the foreseeable future.
The United States:
Indian Ocean region remains strategically important for USA
and its allies, compelling it to remain actively engaged in the IOR and the
wider Asia-Pacific region. During Cold War US maritime strategy was designed to
meet the Soviet challenge through global naval conflict on a Mahanian scale,
but since the end of the Cold War, the US Navy is now trained, equipped and
deployed for what is called “Expeditionary Warfare, which essentially means
support of operations ashore in Third World countries.[13]
Furthermore with the changing global scenario and rise of china, compelled United
States performed a strategic “pivot” toward the Indo-Pacific region, along with
greater Asia overall. The rebalancing of forces and posture toward South and
East Asia is seen as us creating security architecture to protect its interest
in Indian Ocean and also contain chain”.[14]
In that USA terms its relation with India as an important element of rebalance
in Asia pacific region. Furthermore its core interest also lies in tapping the
hydrocarbon resources of the Middle East and growing economic interaction with
booming economies in the region like China, Taiwan, India, Japan and Southeast
Asia.
China:
The Peoples
Republic of China in her
determined bid for regional preponderance, safeguard her vital energy lifelines
from the Persian Gulf, desire to reunite Taiwan with mainland China, dominate
south china sea and ultimately, for superpower status, it has made strategic
shift in thinking about their surface fleet moving away from basic coastal and
regional defense, pushing for a “blue-water” navy. Niclas Weimar has concluded five major interests and
strategic objectives that the PRC have with respect to the Indian Ocean:
·
Security of its
seaborne trade, in particular energy imports.
·
Access the vast
energy and marine resources of the Indian Ocean region.
·
Develop alternative
trade routes and channels of resource supply largely circumventing the Indian
Ocean.
·
Enhance its
strategic presence and project its power status through naval
strength.
·
Prevent other regional heavyweights such
as India for naval dominance.[15]
China’s
President, Hu Jintao, introduced the Malacca Dilemma, asserting that closing
off the Strait of Malacca would choke off China strategically. In order to
mitigate china has strengthening its investment in the littoral Indian Ocean
states in order to diversify its options for importing oil to the Chinese
mainland. Furthermore President Xi Jinping introduce Silk Route, Maritime Silk
Route and ‘One Belt- One Road’ (OBOR) initiative, expanding its connectivity as
well as expanding its maritime power into the region in order to secure its
investments and trade. China
has provided massive assistance for construction of the Gwadar deep-sea port on
Pakistan’s Makaran coast as part of the ‘China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor’ (CPEC). Further China is modernising its
military base at Djibouti and an artificial island in the Maldives.
It has also undertaken major arms
transfers to a number of countries around the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi
Arabia and Iran. China present a significant strategic security
challenge for other great powers as it would solidify its economic footprint in
the region and give potential for forward deployed naval forces from the mainland
China.[16]
Pakistan:
The Pakistan
Navy at face value does not seem as capable as Indian navy, but does retain
significant conventional and nuclear capability to be employed in the Indian
Ocean, which has serious implications on maritime warfare and nuclear
deterrence for the region. Chinese investment into CPEC and Gwadar port made Pakistan
saw this as a chance to compete strategically and economically with India.”[17]
With this Pakistan will remain one
of the factors in India’s security calculus in the foreseeable future.
India’s Maritime Strategy:
It is therefore clear that India must have “the freedom to use the seas for its national purposes and the wherewithal to safeguard its maritime interests under all circumstances”. Taking into account of strategic scenario a broad vision of its maritime strategy could be stated in these words:[18]
· In conjunction with other Armed Forces of the union, act to deter or defeat any threats or aggression against the territory, peoples or maritime interests of India, both in war and peace;
· Project influence in our maritime area of interest, to further the nation’s political, economic and security objectives;
· Maintain freedom of navigation and strengthening the international legal regime at sea, particularly UNCLOS, for all-round benefit.
· Provide
maritime assistance and establishing protocols for enhancing disaster
prevention and relief as well as search and rescue operations,
· Undertake
cooperation and coordination between various navies to fight piracy,
terrorism, smuggling, and illegal weapons proliferation at sea.[19]
Each of these tasks requires a detailed strategy for its correct and coherent implementation.
Sea Control and Sea Denial: The principle for sea-denial and
sea-control are two fundamentals of Maritime security. Sea-control is an
offensive posture where the seas are under one's control and this requires
air-support. Sea-denial is a defensive strategy wherein extra regional powers
should be denied access to the seas. This is achieved more through submarines. Sea
control is a central concept around which the Indian Navy operates. It is a key
component of the strategy for conflict and a prerequisite for most naval
operations. India's objective should be to achieve sea-control, but ground
realities today are different. However Indian
Navy can exercise sea denial as an offensive measure, to reduce the adversary’s
freedom of action and to degrade his operations so as to thwart their purpose
of deployment.
Power Projection: In order to effectively provide security in the maritime
realm of the IOR, the Indian Navy will need to rely on a doctrine of power
projection and sea control, similar to what the United States Navy has employed
since World War II. To this effect, “Indian Navy will need to project combat
force in and from the maritime domain, and undertake offensive action for
national defence.” This projection of combat force will involve a consolidated
effort across the spectrum of maritime warfare to include anti-surface,
anti-submarine and anti-air warfare demonstrated from all platforms in the
navy’s inventory. To put it simply India will rely on sea control and denial
within their aforementioned primary areas of interest and power projection for
their secondary areas of interest. Furthermore induction of new aircraft
carrier and doctrinal development will prove critical in power projection.
Strategic
Naval Exercises: The Indian Navy in order to secure Sea
Lanes of Communication, enhancing interoperability at sea, intelligence-
sharing, anti-piracy operations and maintaining freedom of navigation has
participated in many bi-laterally and multi-laterally naval exercises with the
United States (Malabar- India, USA, Japan), France (Varun and Samudra Shakti),
Australia (Ausindex), Bangladesh (Sampriti), Russia (Indra NAV) and Thailand (
INDO-THAI CORPAT), Oman (Naseem-Al-Bahar), the United Kingdom (konkan), Sri
Lanka (Slinex), Brazil & South Africa (IBSMAR), Singapore (Simbex), Japan (Sahyog-Kaijin),
Malaysia (ARF DIREx), Myanmar (IMCOR).
Quadrilateral
Security Forum (QUAD) : QUAD Comprises of India,
Japan, Australia and the United States, is not alliance but a group of
countries which are interested in strengthening the rules-based order in Asia,
freedom of navigation and over flight in the maritime commons, respect for
international law, enhancing connectivity, maritime security, non-proliferation
and terrorism the Indo-Pacific region.[20]
However China has strong reservations against QUAD and dubbed it as an
anti-China forum. But this allegation is factually wrong as views and opinions
discussed and exchanged by the member countries are too large and China is only
one among several issues that dominated the agenda of the meetings. However no
other country has been so aggressive to alter the balance of power in the
region than China; and thus it is quite natural that important democracies of
the region need to address this issue.[21] Furthermore OUAD is a work
in progress to foster Free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific
region.”
Keeping
its primary national interest of securing
SLOCs, rise of China, protecting Seabed resources and interest in
Antarctica, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2015 lunched
SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), “is to seek a
climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and
norms by all countries.” India wants collective action and cooperation with all
prominent actors which has stake in IOR to ensure greater transparency, rule of
law, peaceful resolution of disputes and increase in maritime cooperation in
IOR.[22]
21st
century will be the ‘Century of the Seas’. In the emerging security
environment, India's dependence on the sea has increased in terms of trade,
energy resources, shipping, sustainable exploitation of marine resources, and
ocean research and exploration. SLOCs in IOR will be increasingly vulnerable to
disruption from range of traditional and nontraditional threats. The continuing
militarization of the Indian Ocean and china’s greater involvement in IOR will
also impact Indian interest in IOR. India’s maritime strategy comes from the
need to secure her maritime borders and ensure stability along the SLOCs to
foster secure maritime trade. India’s economic policies and national focus should
enable the navy to modernize and indigenize the fleet to deter threats within
the IOR. The Indian Navy needs to have greater cooperative ventures with littoral
states and friendly navies to further ensure security and stability in the
region. If India wants to achieve peace, security and development it has to the
look beyond its land border into the Indian Ocean.
[1] “The Maritime Future of the
Indian Ocean”(2010) The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), The Hague.
[2] Pant, K.C. (2001), “Dimensions of National Security: The maritime aspect”11th Admiral R.D.
Katari Memorial Lecture, New Delhi.
[3] “The Maritime Future of the
Indian Ocean”(2010) The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), The Hague.
[4] “Proceedings from the Indian
ocean maritime security symposium” (2009), Australian Defence College Canberra,
Australia, [online: web] accessed on 10 May 2020:http://
www.jhuapl.edu/ourwork/nsa/papers/iomss_proceedings09.pdf.
[5] Davish, E Alexander and Jonathan,
Balls N (2020), “The Indian Ocean region in the 21st century:
geopolitical, economic and environmental ties”, Australia India institute, University
of Melbourne.
[6] “Text of the PM’s Remarks on the
Commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda,” Narendra Modi, March 12, 2015, [online:
web] accessed on 5 December 2020:http://www.narendramodi.in/text-of-the-pms-remarks-on-the-commissioning-of-coast-ship-barracuda-2954.
[7] “Fisheries and Aquaculture” (2018),
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, Farm Sector Policy Department, NABARD Head
Office, Mumbai , [online: web] accessed on 15 December 2020,
https://www.nabard.org/auth/writereaddata/file/Fisheries%20and%20Aquaculture.pdf
[8] Ross, Vincent Van
(2008), “Need to tone up maritime security in India”, New Delhi. [online: web]
accessed on 1 November 2020:http://topangle.instablogs.com/entry/need-to-tone-up-maritime-security-in-india/
[9] “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian
Maritime Security Strategy” (2015), Indian Navy, Naval Strategic Publication
(NSP), October, New Delhi.
[10] Chauhan, Vice Admiral Pradeep
(2020), “India’s Proposed Maritime Strategy”, [online: web] accessed on 5 October
2020: https://maritimeindia.org/indias-proposed-maritime-strategy/
[11] Pranab (2012), “India aiming to become maritime power”, Hindustan Times, 2012, [online: web] accessed on
11 December 2020:http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/kolkata/print/234026.aspx
[12] Ibid….
[13] Mehta, Sureesh
(2008) “Shaping India’s maritime strategy- opportunities & challenges”,
Speech Presented at Indian national defense college, [online: web] accessed on
20 November
2020:http://indiannavy.nic.in/cns_add2.htm
[14] Burgess, Stephen (2015), “The U.S. Pivot to Asia and Renewal of the
U.S.–India Strategic Partnership”, [online: web] accessed on 8 December
2020:http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2015.1069517
[15] Niclas Weimar (2013),
“Sino-Indian Power Preponderance in Maritime Asia: A (Re-) source of Conflict
in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea”, Global Change, Peace &
Security 25, no. 1: 15.
[16] Burgess, Stephen (2015), “The
U.S. Pivot to Asia and Renewal of the U.S.–India Strategic Partnership”,
[online: web] accessed on 8 December
2020:http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2015.1069517.
[17] Smith, Cody T.(2017), “ Century
of the Seas : Unlocking Indian Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century ”,
[online: web] accessed on 16 December
2020:http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046925.pdf
[18] Ibid……
[19] “Ensuring
Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy” (2015), Indian Navy, Naval
Strategic Publication (NSP), October, New Delhi.
[21] Mahapatra, Prof. Chintamani (2021), “QUAD: An emerging
Security Forum in Indo-Pacific”, [online: web] accessed on 15 January 2021:http://airworldservice.org/english/archives/106080
[22] “Text of the PM’s Remarks on the Commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda,” Narendra Modi 12 March, 2015, [online: web] accessed on 5 December 2020:http://www.narendramodi.in/text-of-the-pms-remarks-on-the-commissioning-of-coast-ship-barracuda-2954
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